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MBA论文_科技型企业投资风险分担机制研究基于投资者视角

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西安理工大学硕士学位论文
results of the model, the way to share the risk of adverse selection is to increase the "locking
negotiation cost" through prior contract, and at the same time reduce the benefits that the
opportunistic behavior of the founders of science and technology enterprises can bring to the
founders of science and technology enterprises; The sharing mechanism of moral hazard for
science and technology enterprises in the initial stage is to design relevant incentive contracts
and strengthen supervision and management after investment.
Finally, the moral hazard caused by information asymmetry and the credit risk caused by
adverse selection risk in the investment process of science and technology enterprises in the
growth period are discussed respectively. It is found that the "financial subsidy" and "tax
preference" of government agencies can provide credit risk compensation for commercial banks
to share the credit risk of science and technology enterprises in commercial banks. In the credit
risk sharing of commercial banks by guarantee institutions, it is found that in order to realize
the credit risk sharing of growth-oriented science and technology enterprises, two conditions
should be met: First, the guarantee leverage ratio should be greater than the sum of guarantee
rate and loan interest rate and the ratio of guarantee rate; Second, the repayment probability of
enterprises should be greater than the minimum repayment probability acceptable to
commercial banks. From the perspective of tripartite cooperation between government, banks
and contractors, if the credit risk of science and technology enterprises is given, the three
parties involved in investment will promote each other, and if the credit risk of science and
technology enterprises is relatively high, even if there is credit risk sharing between government
agencies and guarantee institutions, it will not improve the effect of credit risk sharing of
science and technology enterprises, but will increase the total risk.
Key words: Scientific and technological enterprises; Enterprise life cycle;Investment risk;
Ethical risk; Adverse selection risk; Credit risk
IV
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