摘要
随着全球化战略发展不断深入，外国无数知名企业争相涌入庞大的中国市场，严
重冲击了民族品牌原有的市场份额，很多知名企业逐渐走向衰退，甚至个别企业被迫
进行了破产清算与重组。一个企业要想在激烈的市场竞争稳定市场份额，必须进行持
续的技术创新活动。而高管团队作为企业进行技术创新的最终决策者，其风险偏好对
企业的经营战略决策至关重要。技术创新活动的周期长、风险高，厌恶风险的高管可
能会因创新项目的市场前景迷茫、惧怕研发失败等原因而堪忧，不希望将有限的资源
投资此类项目，极易导致“投资不足”现象，从而使企业落后于欧亿·体育（中国）有限公司的发展，损害股
东和债权人的利益。偏好风险的高管希望获得更丰厚的回报，得到更多的个人利益，
会更加注重投资创新项目带来的益处。由于高回报的项目往往伴随着较高的风险，高
管团队可能因信息对称导致投资决策失误。内部控制作为企业内部治理的一种重要方
式，有效的内部控制在很大程度上可以有效的抑制高管团队的决策失误，防止高管团
队的决策凌驾内部控制之上、投资项目失败增加企业财务风险。提升内部控制质量成
为企业未来的发展趋势。高管团队的风险偏好在一定程度上会影响企业内部控制执行
的有效性，因此，本文将高管团队的风险偏好与企业内部控制质量、技术创新三者相
结合，进行了深入研究。
本文梳理了相关概念，结合高层梯队理论、技术创新理论、委托代理理论，以企
业的相关数据为研究对象，研究高管团队的风险偏好是如何影响企业的技术创新活动，
内部控制质量是如何在高管团队的风险偏好与企业技术创新活动之间发挥作用，依据
现有研究结论，提出相关假设，并构建了三个模型。本文选取了 2016-2020年沪、深
主板 A股的上市国有企业为样本，实证检验了高管团队的风险偏好与企业技术创新活
动之间的关系，以及内部控制质量在两者间发挥的作用，并在此基础上，加入了非国
有企业的样本数据，进一步研究了在不同产权性质下，高管团队的风险偏好与企业技
术创新活动的关系是否存在差异？
通过实证研究，本文的研究结论如下：（ 1）国有企业高管团队的风险偏好与技
术创新活动呈现显著的倒 U型关系，即当高管团队的风险偏好处于一定范围时，风险
偏好有助于国有企业的技术创新活动，但当风险偏好超过该范围时，风险偏好将抑制
国有企业的技术创新活动；（2）当国有企业高管团队的风险偏好在一定范围内，内
部控制质量在高管团队的风险偏好与技术创新之间产生部分中介效应；（ 3）相比于
国有企业，非国有企业的高管团队风险偏好对企业技术创新活动会更加明显。
此外，本文基于研究结论，提出以下建议：企业应吸纳更加的多元文化背景的人
才加入高管团队，形成合理的高管团队配置；企业应给予高管合理比例的股权激励，
适当提高高管的风险偏好水平；企业应更加注重内部控制的建设，发挥内部控制应有
的功能；深化国有企业的改革，更好的促进国有资产的增值。此外，政府应完善知识
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产权保护的相关法律法规，制定更为细致的创新补贴规则，为国有企业的技术创新活
动创造良好的外部环境。最终，本文指出研究的不足与未来的研究展望。
关键词：国有企业；高管团队；风险偏好；内部控制质量；技术创新
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ABSTRACT
Withthe deepeningdevelopment ofglobalizationstrategy, numerousforeign
well-known enterprises rush into the huge Chinese market, seriously impacting the original
market share of national brands, many well-known enterprises gradually decline, and even
some enterprises are forced to go bankrupt, liquidation and reorganization. If an enterprise
wants to stabilize its market share in the fierce market competition, it must carry out
continuous technological innovation activities. As the final decision maker of technological
innovation, the risk preference of senior management team plays an important role in the
strategic decision-making of enterprises. Technology innovation activities, long cycle, high
risk, risk aversion executives may be due to innovative projects such as market research and
development of confusion, fear of failure reasons, don't want to investment projects such as
limited resources, easily lead to "underinvestment" phenomenon, so as to make the
enterprise lagged behind the development of the industry, damage the interests of the
shareholders and creditors. Executives with a taste for risk, hoping for better returns and
more personal benefits, will pay more attention to the benefits of investing in innovative
projects. As projects with high returns are often accompanied by high risks, senior
management teams may make investment decisions wrong due to information symmetry.
Internal control is an important way of enterprise internal governance. Effective internal
control can effectively restrain the decision-making mistakes of senior management team to
a large extent, prevent the decision-making of senior management team from overtaking
internal control, and the failure of investment projects increases the financial risk of
enterprises. Improving the quality of internal control has become the future development
trend of enterprises. The risk preference of the top management team will affect the
effectiveness of the implementation of internal control to a certain extent. Therefore, this
paper combines the risk preference of the top management team with the quality of internal
control and technological innovation to conduct in-depth research.
Combedtherelatedconcepts,thispapercombinedwiththeupperechelon
theory,technologicalinnovationtheory,principal-agenttheory,therelevantdataof
state-owned enterprises as the research object,studies the risk preference of senior team is
how to affect the enterprise technology innovation activities,the risk preference of how the
internal control quality in the senior management team and the enterprise technological
innovationactivitiesplayarolebetweenonthebasisofexistingresearch
conclusion.Relevant hypotheses are proposed and three models are constructed.This article
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