摘 要
投资在经济社会的发展中一直扮演着相当重要的角色。企业的投资决策作为
现代公司理论的核心问题之一，在公司创造自身价值和推动一国经济发展中起着
至关重要的作用。投资是拉动经济增长的动力，投资效率的高低直接关系公司的
成败，高效率的投资将使公司在激烈的竞争中占据有力地位，因而，每个企业都
希望做出最优的投资决策。然而，在现实世界中，市场的非完美性、信息的非对
称性、委托代理冲突等问题会导致企业产生过度投资或投资不足的非效率投资行
为。作为现代公司治理理论的重要组成部分，公司控制权理论的主要内容是研究
现代股份制公司中决定公司资源配置的权力。所有权与控制权的分离使得现代公
司制企业中的控制权配置在股东、董事会、经理层等主要层面进行划分，这些主
要主体间的控制权配置方式和相互制衡关系共同构成了公司内部控制权配置的
总体框架，而不同的控制权配置方式会对企业的投资决策行为产生不同的影响。

基于此，本文以 2009 年~2012 年沪深股市 A 股上市公司的数据为样本，借
鉴 Richardson（2006）期望投资模型以衡量企业投资效率水平，并采用多元线性
回归模型对控制权配置与投资效率之间的关系进行研究，结果表明：①不同性质
的股权会对公司治理效果产生不同的影响，国有控股企业更容易产生非效率投资
行为；②第一大股东持股比例与投资效率呈显著负相关，且国有控股企业表现的
更为明显；③管理层持股比例与投资效率呈正相关，且非国有控股企业更加明显；
④独立董事比例与投资效率呈显著正相关，且非国有控股企业的影响更加明显，
而两职合一却无益于企业投资效率的提高。在回归分析的基础上，本文又从公司
股权性质、第一大股东持股比例、管理层持股比例、董事会状况四个方面提出了
改善公司投资效率的方法。

关键词：控制权配置；投资效率；实证研究

Abstract
Investment has played a very important role in economic and social development.
As one of the core issue of modern firm theory, investment decision-making has
played a vital role in the company to create its value. Investment can make the growth
of economic and the investment efficiency has a close relationship with the success of
the company, thus each enterprise hope to make an optimal investment decisions.
However, in the real world, the perfection of the market, information asymmetry and
the principal-agent conflict can lead to problems such as excess or insufficient
investment behavior. The main content of the corporate control theory is to study the
resource allocation in company. The separation of ownership and control makes the
enterprise control configuration be divided in the shareholders and board and
managers. Different ways of control configuration can make different influence on
enterprise's investment decision-making behavior.
Based on those options, this thesis uses the companies’ data as sample from year
2009 to year 2012 of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market to find the relationship
between control configuration and the investment efficiency, and the results of the
regression model are as follows: ①different equity will produce different effects on
corporate governance and the state-owned holding companies are more likely to
produce inefficient investment behavior; ②The biggest shareholder’s shareholding
proportion has negative correlation with the investment efficiency and the
state-owned holding company performance more obviously; ③The management
ownership has positive relation with the investment efficiency significantly, and
non-state-owned holding companies performance more obviously; ④The independent
directors proportion has positive effect to reduce the investment efficiency and the
influence of the non-state-owned holding companies is more obvious. At the same
time, the joining together of two position is not conducive to business investment
efficiency. On the basis of regression analysis, the thesis put forward the methods to
improve efficiency in corporate investment from the nature of the company and the
biggest shareholder and the management shareholding and the board state. In addition,
this thesis lists the limitation of the full text, and proposes the prospect for future
related research.
Key words: allocation of control rights; investment efficiency; empirical research