近些年来，随着我国社会经济步入高质量发展阶段，企业层面最关注的核心问题就 是如何借助技术创新来提升企业生产运营效率、降低运营成本以更好地提升企业价值、 满足市场需求等。同时全球科技创新浪潮带来的挑战和竞争压力也迫使我国企业技术创 新必须进入快车道，摆脱传统的模仿、跟随等模式而积极转向自主创新模式，以提升我 国持续创新能力和水平，进而实现我国社会经济发展的高质量保障。然而，在经营权与 所有权分开的现代企业制度下，承担企业控制权的经理层与股东利益并非完全一致，特 别是鉴于企业技术创新投资具有投资大、周期长、风险高、收益不确定等诸多特征，经 理层基于个人利益驱动常倾向于减少对股东而言具有长期价值的研发投入，从而制约了 企业核心竞争能力的培育。 本研究以公司治理理论和技术创新理论为理论基础，客观梳理和总结了现代企业制 度董事会特征影响研发投入的内在机理，并以此为基础考察了董事会结构特征、行为特 征及激励特征对企业研发投入影响的相关逻辑路径，并提出了相关研究假设。在此基础 上，本研究利用我国沪深两市A股制造业上市公司样本经验数据，实证检验了相关研究 假设。实证研究结果表明，一方面要提高董事会相对于经理层的独立性，包括促进董事 长与总经理两职分离、增加外部独立董事比例、强化董事会股权激励，从而有助于强化 对经理层研发投入决策的监督能力，并且较高比例的独立董事除了提高董事会对经理层 研发投入决策监督能力外，还能为经理层研发投入决策提供专家意见和建议。而且董事 会股权激励建设将有助于密切董事与企业的之间的长期利益一致性，从而有助于提高董 事会对企业研发投入决策的关注程度，从而确保经理层研发投入决策的科学程度。另一 方面要强化董事会运作机制建设，切实提高运作效率才能发挥在企业战略管理过程中的 作用。研究结论对于指导我国上市公司治理建设、增强企业研发投入具有重要参考价值。 关键词：技术创新,研发投入,董事会特征,公司治理 III ABSTRACT In recent years, with China's social and economic development into a high-quality stage of development, how to scientifically and effectively transform economic development momentum, improve the quality of economic development, enhance economic efficiency has become a micro-enterprise level must pay attention to the matter, and the core issue is how to use technological innovation to enhance the efficiency of enterprise production and operation. And reduce operating costs to better enhance enterprise value and meet market demand. Especially with the deepening of China's globalization process, the challenges and competitive pressures brought by the global wave of scientific and technological innovation force China's enterprises to enter the fast lane of technological innovation, must get rid of the traditional imitation, follow and other models and actively turn to independent innovation model, in order to enhance China's sustainable innovation capacity and level, and then To realize the high quality guarantee of China's social and economic development. However, under the modern enterprise system, the separation of ownership and management rights makes the interests of managers and shareholders who assume the control rights of enterprises not entirely consistent. Especially in view of the characteristics of large investment, long cycle, high risk, uncertain returns and so on, managers often tend to be driven by personal interests. To reduce the long-term value of technological innovation investment for shareholders, thus restricting the cultivation of core competitiveness of enterprises. Based on the theory of corporate governance and technological innovation, this paper objectively summarizes the internal mechanism of the influence of Board Governance on technological innovation investment in modern enterprise system, and on this basis investigates the relevant logic of the influence of board structure, behavior and incentive characteristics on technological innovation investment in enterprises. Compile paths and put forward relevant research hypotheses. On this basis, this study uses the empirical data of A-share Manufacturing Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets to test the relevant hypotheses. The empirical results show that, on the one hand, the independence of the board of directors relative to the managers should be improved, including promoting the IV separation of the chairman and the general manager, increasing the proportion of independent directors outside, and strengthening the equity incentive of the board of directors, so as to help strengthen the supervisory ability of the managers to make investment decisions on technological innovation, and a higher proportion of independent directors. In addition to improving the ability of the board of directors to supervise the technological innovation decision-making of the managers, the directors can also provide expert opinions and suggestions for the technological innovation decision-making of the managers. Moreover, the construction of board equity incentive will help to close the long-term interests consistency between directors and enterprises, and thus help to enhance the attention of the board of directors to the technological innovation decision-making of enterprises, so as to ensure the scientific level of managers'technological innovation decision-making. On the other hand, it is necessary to strengthen the construction of the operation mechanism of the board of directors and improve the operation efficiency in order to play a role in the process of enterprise strategic management. The research conclusion has important reference value for guiding the governance construction of Listed Companies in China and enhancing the investment of technological innovation. KEY WORDS: Technological Innovation, R&D Investment, Board Characteristics, Corporate Governance V 目 录 摘要 ............................................................................................................................ I ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... III 第1章 绪论 ................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 选题背景与研究意义 ................................................................................... 1 1.1.1 选题背景 .............................................................................................. 1 1.1.2 研究意义 .............................................................................................. 2 1.2 研究内容与结构框架 ................................................................................... 3 1.2.1 研究内容 .............................................................................................. 3 1.2.2 研究目标 .............................................................................................. 4 1.2.3 结构安排 .............................................................................................. 4 1.3 本文创新点 ................................................................................................... 6 第2章 理论基础与文献回顾 .................................................................................... 7 2.1 技术创新理论与风险 ................................................................................... 7 2.1.1 技术创新概念 ...................................................................................... 7 2.1.2 技术创新的风险 .................................................................................. 7 2.2 研发投入的相关概念 ................................................................................... 8 2.3 董事会治理相关理论 ................................................................................... 9 2.3.1 董事会治理的理论基础 ...................................................................... 9 2.3.2 董事会特征与董事会治理职能 ........................................................ 11 2.3.3 董事会特征与企业研发投入息息相关 ............................................ 13 2.4 国内外研究现状 ......................................................................................... 13 2.4.1 国外研究现状 .................................................................................... 13 2.4.2