摘要
目前，股权质押已成为我国较为热门的融资方式，在 A股市场呈现无股不
押的局面。因为其融资方式方便快捷、资本成本低以及限制条件少。对于质权方
来说，股权是一项高质量的质押资产。对于控股股东来说，在保持企业控制权的
同时，能将存量资产转为流动资产，快速融入自身或企业所需资金。但控股股东
股权质押后面临控制权转移的风险以及现金流权下降，控股股东会采取相应的措
施来稳定股价或在股价下跌时有充足的资金进行补仓。而税收规避不仅可以减少
企业的纳税负担，还可以增加企业的现金流量，给企业带来直接的经济利益。因
此，本文从控股股东股权质押视角出发，研究其对税收规避的影响，并探讨控股
股东股权质押对税收规避的影响路径。
本文以沪深 A股 2013年-2020年上市公司作为研究样本，通过梳理现有研
究成果，结合控制权收益理论、信息不对称理论以及优序融资理论分析讨论了控
股股东控权质押对税收规避的影响以及融资约束在两者之间发挥的中介作用，提
出了本文研究的三个主要假设。通过理论分析和实证检验，得出本文的研究结果：
（1）存在控股股东股权质押的企业具有税收规避行为，且质押比例越高，税收
规避的程度越大；（2）控股股东股权质押加剧了企业的融资约束，两者之间表
现为正相关关系；（3）融资约束在控股股东股权质押影响税收规避的过程中，
发挥了部分中介作用。在进一步研究中发现，作为外部治理的高审计质量能有效
缓解控股股东股权质押与税收规避的正相关关系。
本文的研究为更充分的认识税收规避的影响因素和控股股东股权质押的经
济后果提供了新的视角，引入融资约束中介变量更加完整的了解影响过程，从理
论上丰富了控股股东股权质押和税收规避的研究方向。并从政府角度、监管层角
度、企业角度以及审计管理角度等方面提出如加强对控股股东股权质押行为的监
督、完善融资渠道、健全股权质押法律法规、强制相关信息披露及加强事务所的
声誉建设等政策性建议，对约束控股股东股权质押行为以及减少企业税收规避有
一定的实践意义。
关键词：控股股东；股权质押；税收规避；融资约束；审计质量
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ABSTRACT
At present, equity pledge has become a relatively popular financing method in
China, showing a situation of no shares in the A-share market.Because its financing
method is convenient and fast, low cost of capital and few restrictions.For the pledgee,
equity is also a high-quality pledge asset.For the controlling shareholders, while
maintaining the control of the enterprise, they can convert the stock assets into current
assetsandquickly integrateintothefunds neededbythemselvesorthe
enterprise.However, controlling shareholders face the risk of transfer of control and a
decline in cash flow rights after pledging their shares, and controlling shareholders
will take appropriate initiatives to stabilize the share price or have sufficient funds to
cover their positions in the event of a decline in the share price.Tax avoidance can not
only reduce the tax burden of enterprises, but also increase the cash flow of
enterprises and bring direct economic benefits to enterprises.Therefore, this paper
examinesits impactontax avoidancefromtheperspective ofcontrolling
shareholder's equity pledge and discusses the impact path of controlling shareholder's
equity pledge on tax avoidance.
This paper uses listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from
2013-2020 as the research sample, by sorting out the existing research results,
combined with the theory of control rights income, information asymmetry theory and
priority financingtheory, thispaper discussesthe impactof thecontrolling
shareholder's pledge of control rights on tax avoidance and the intermediary role of
financing constraints between the two, put forward the three main hypotheses in this
paper.Through theoretical analysis and empirical test, the research results of this paper
are: (1) Companies with controlling shareholder equity pledge have tax avoidance
behavior, and the higher the pledge ratio, the greater the degree of tax avoidance;(2)
The controlling shareholder equity pledge intensifies the financing constraint of the
enterprise; (3) The financing constraint plays a partial intermediary role in the process
of the controlling shareholderequity pledge affecting tax avoidance.Infurther
research, it is found that audit quality as external governance can effectively alleviate
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the positive correlation betweencontrolling shareholder equity pledge and tax
avoidance.
The research of this paper provides a new perspective for a fuller understanding
of the influencing factors of tax avoidance and the economic consequences of equity
pledge by controlling shareholders, and introduces financing constraints mediating
variables to more completelyunderstand the impact process, and theoretically
enriches the research direction of controlling shareholder equity pledge and tax
avoidance.From the perspective of the government, the regulator, the enterprise and
the audit management, the company strengthens the supervision of the equity pledge
of the controlling shareholders, improving the financing channels, improving the laws
and regulations ofequity pledge, forcing relevantinformation disclosure, and
strengthening thereputationconstruction ofthe firm.Ithascertain practical
significance to restrain the equity pledge behavior of the controlling shareholders and
reduce the enterprise tax avoidance.
Key words: Controlling shareholder,Equity pledge,Tax avoidance,Fi-
nancing constraints, Audit quality
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