I 摘要 改革开放以来，国企改革不断取得重大进展，总体上已经同市场相融合，为推动经 济社会发展、保障和改善民生、开拓国际市场、增强我国综合实力作出了重大贡献。但 国有企业受到委托代理和高管激励制度不健全等因素影响，导致代理成本增高，产生了 内部人控制、利益输送、国有资产流失等负面问题，影响企业绩效。如何在深化国有企 业改革的背景下制定科学高效的高管激励制度，降低委托代理成本，提高国有企业绩效， 需要有效的实证研究作为支撑。本文基于委托代理理论的视角，在研究高管激励对公司 绩效影响效果的基础上，进一步分析了不同股权性质企业高管激励对企业绩效的影响差 异，结论对我国上市公司改进高管激励制度有一定的理论意义和现实意义。 论文在总结国内外文献和理论的基础上，明确相关概念并分析了股权性质、高管薪 酬激励、高管股权激励与公司绩效的关系，通过委托代理理论、激励理论、信息不对称 理论分析了我国上市公司高管激励现状。在理论分析的基础上提出了相应的研究假设， 本文选取中国A股上市公司2007-2018年数据为样本，以股权性质、高管激励、公司绩 效的有关变量构建模型，用STATA.12.0进行实证回归分析，在此基础上，深入分析了研 究内容在地区、欧亿·体育（中国）有限公司和时间上的异质特征。研究发现：高管薪酬激励水平对上市公司绩 效具有显著正影响；上市公司股权激励水平对上市公司绩效具有显著正影响；高管薪酬 激励水平对国有上市公司绩效具有显著正影响；高管股权激励水平对国有上市公司绩效 具有显著正影响；国有控股组织形式对上市公司绩效具有显著负影响。提出改进高管薪 酬激励机制、建立高管约束机制、深化国有企业混合所有制改革、深化国有企业高管激 励制度改革的对策建议。 关键词：股权性质；高管激励；公司绩效；薪酬激励；股权激励 Abstract II Abstract Sincethereformandopeningup,greatprogresshasbeenmadeinthereformof state-ownedenterprises,whichhasbeenintegratedwiththemarketingeneral,andhasmade greatcontributionstopromotingeconomicandsocialdevelopment,ensuringandimproving people'slivelihood,openingupinternationalmarketsandenhancingChina'scomprehensive strength.However,thestate-ownedenterprisesareaffectedbysuchfactorsastheimperfect principal-agentandexecutiveincentivesystem,whichleadstotheincreaseofagencycost, resultinginsuchnegativeproblemsasinsidercontrol,interesttransmission,lossof state-ownedassets,etc.,whichaffecttheperformanceofenterprises.Howtoformulatea scientificandefficientexecutiveincentivesystem,reducethecostofprincipal-agentand improvetheperformanceofstate-ownedenterprisesinthecontextofdeepeningthereformof state-ownedenterprises,needseffectiveempiricalresearchassupport.Fromtheperspective ofprincipal-agenttheory,thispaperstudiestheeffectofexecutiveincentiveoncorporate performance,andfurtheranalyzesthedifferencesintheimpactofexecutiveincentiveon corporateperformanceindifferentequitycompanies.Theconclusionhascertaintheoretical andpracticalsignificanceforimprovingexecutiveincentivesystemofListedCompaniesin China. Basedontheliteratureandtheoryathomeandabroad,thispaperdefinestherelevant conceptsandanalyzesthenatureofequity,executivecompensationincentive,therelationship betweenexecutiveequityincentiveandcorporateperformance.Throughtheprincipal-agent theory,incentivetheory,informationasymmetrytheory,thispaperanalyzesthecurrent situationofexecutiveincentiveinChina'slistedcompanies.Basedonthetheoreticalanalysis, thispaperputsforwardthecorrespondingresearchhypotheses,selectsthedataofChina's A-sharelistedcompaniesfrom2007to2018asthesamples,constructsthemodelwiththe relevantvariablesofequitynature,executiveincentiveandcorporateperformance,and conductstheempiricalregressionanalysiswithSTATA.12.0.Onthisbasis,itanalyzesthe heterogeneityoftheresearchcontentintheregion,industryandtime.Theresultsshowthat: thelevelofexecutivecompensationincentivehasasignificantpositiveimpactonthe performanceoflistedcompanies;thelevelofequityincentivehasasignificantpositive impactontheperformanceoflistedcompanies;thelevelofexecutivecompensationincentive hasasignificantpositiveimpactontheperformanceofstate-ownedlistedcompanies;the levelofexecutiveequityincentivehasasignificantpositiveimpactontheperformanceof state-ownedlistedcompanies;theformofstate-ownedholdingorganizationhasasignificant positiveimpactontheperformanceoflistedcompaniesPerformancehasasignificant negativeimpact.Proposetoimproveexecutivecompensationincentivemechanism.Establish amechanismforseniormanagementrestraint.Wewilldeepenthereformofmixedownership Abstract III ofstate-ownedenterprises.Countermeasuresandsuggestionsondeepeningthereformof incentivesystemforseniorexecutivesinstate-ownedenterprises. KeyWords:Ownership；Executiveincentive；Companyperformance；Salaryincentive； Stockincentive 目录 IV 目录 第一章绪论...............................................................................................................................1 1.1研究背景及意义..........................................................................................................1 1.1.1研究背景............................................................................................................1 1.1.2研究意义...........................................................................................................3 1.2文献综述......................................................................................................................4 1.2.1国外研究...........................................................................................................4 1.2.2国内研究...........................................................................................................5 1.2.3文献述评...........................................................................................................8 1.3论文研究方法与内容................................................................................................10 1.3.1论文研究方法.................................................................................................10 1.3.2论文研究内容.................................................................................................10 1.4论文写作框架............................................................................................................12 第二章概念界定及理论基础.................................................................................................13 2.1概念界定....................................................................................................................13 2.1.1股权性质.........................................................................................................13 2.1.2高管人员.........................................................................................................13 2.1.3高管激励.........................................................................................................14 2.1.4公司绩效.........................................................................................................14 2.2理论基础....................................................................................................................15 2.2.1委托代理理论.................................................................................................15 2.2.2激励理论.........................................................................................................16 2.2.3信息不对称理论.............................................................................................18 第三章研究设计.....................................................................................................................19 3.1研究假设....................................................................................................................19 3.2变量选取....................................................................................................................20 3.3模型构建....................................................................................................................20 3.4样本选取与数据来源................................................................................................21 第四章检验结果与分析.........................................................................................................22 4.1样本数据描述性统计分析.......................................................