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Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe
Testimony of Todd C. Helmus1
The RAND Corporation2
Addendum to testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Submitted August 30, 2018
ollowing the hearing on August 1, 2018, the congressional committee sought additional
information and requested answers to the questions in this document. The answers were
submitted for the record.
Questions from Senator Tom Cotton
Question 1
As most people are aware, the most detailed accounting of Russia’s past activities is the
Mitrokhin Archive. On page 243 of the Mitrokhin Archive, as detailed in The Sword and the
Shield, it states,
It was the extreme priority attached by the Centre (KGB Headquarters) to discrediting the
policies of the Reagan administration which led Andropov to decree formally on April 12, 1982,
as one of the last acts of his fifteen-year term as chairman of the KGB, that is was the duty of all
foreign intelligence officers, whatever their “line” or department, to participate in active
measures. Ensuring that Reagan did not serve a second term thus became Service A’s most
important objective.
On February 25, 1983, the Centre instructed its three American residences to being planning
actives measures to ensure Reagan’s defeat in the presidential election of November 1984. They
were ordered to acquire contacts on the staffs of all possible presidential candidates and in both
party headquarters…The Centre made clear that any candidate, of either party, would be
preferable to Reagan.
1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as
representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
2 The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make
communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit,
nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.
FResidences around the world were ordered to popularize the slogan “Reagan Means War!”
The Centre announced five active measures “theses” to be used…his militarist adventurism; his
personal responsibility for accelerating the arms race; his support for repressive regimes around
the world; his responsibility for tension with his NATO allies. Active Measures “theses” in
domestic policy included Reagan’s alleged discrimination against ethnic minorities; corruption
in his administration; and Reagan’s subservience to the military-industrial complex.”
So, in 1982, over thirty-five years ago, we had the KGB using active measures in the United
States to sow racial discord, try to create problems with NATO, discredit our nuclear
modernization, undercut military spending, highlight corruptions, and try to encourage the U.S.
to retreat from the world stage. Aren’t the themes the KGB used in 1982, similar to those we’re
seeing the Russian Intelligence Services use on social media in 2018
Answer
The focus of the RAND research used as a basis for my testimony before the committee was
on Russia’s propaganda efforts directed at Eastern Europe.The research for this study was
conducted in 20173. That study, as well as my other research, did not review this historical
analog in great detail, and thus I cannot compare Russia’s campaign against the Reagan
presidency, as articulated above, and Russia’s modern political warfare campaign against the
United States at this time.
Question 2
Isn’t this Russian social media campaign really just old wine in new bottles, with perhaps a
different distributor
Answer
It is true that Russia has historically worked to meddle in the internal affairs of various
foreign countries. For example, a recent RAND Corporation study highlighted a Russian political
warfare campaign in Estonia known as the “Bronze Night,” when Russia, in an effort to respond
to the Estonian government’s quest to move a statue commemorating the Soviet victory in World
War II, launched cyber attacks against the country’s web domains and possibly organized a
major protest that left one dead and 150 injured.5 According to a recent Center for Strategic and
International Studies report, Russia has also cultivated “an opaque web of economic and political
patronage” that sought to influence internal politics, state institutions, and economies of
3 Todd C. Helmus, Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Joshua Mendelsohn, William
Marcellino, Andriy Bega, and Zev Winkelman,
Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian
Propaganda in Eastern Europe
, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2237-OSD, 2018. As of August 30,
2018: /t/RR2237
5 Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, and
Katya Migazheva,
Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses
, Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND Corporation, RR-1772-A, 2018. As of August 30, 2018: /t/RR1772Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Serbia.6 Russia has most certainly sought to assert
influence in other nation states as well.
As the question suggests, what is clearly unique about recent Russian political warfare
activities is its use of social media. The Kremlin initially developed its army of
trolls
(fake social
media accounts managed by Russian agents) and social media
bots
(automated social media
accounts) in order to influence the Russian domestic audience.7 With some apparent success, the
Kremlin then began to train these capabilities on foreign audiences, most immediately against
Ukraine, and then beyond.
These social media operations, which have also included the use of Facebook ads and pages,
are particularly unique and potentially powerful because of their ability to link specific messages
with specific target audiences. A simple review of Facebook’s capability for ad-targeting
illustrates its power as a potential tool for political warfare. Specifically, the medium allows
advertisers access to “powerful audience selection tools” that can be used to “target the people
who are right for your business.”8 Such tools can increase the efficiency and potential efficacy of
messaging campaigns that had, prior to the social media age, not been available at scale to
government propaganda campaigns. The social media campaigns can also mimic popular
conversations and debates and so exert a kind of peer influence on American audiences.
Ensuring that malign actors like Russia do not have easy access to such tools will prove a critical
challenge to technology companies and policymakers