摘要
作为“城市矿山”的电子废弃物中不仅具有多种可资源化再利用的材料,还含有对
环境及人类健康造成威胁的有害物质。因此，电器电子产品制造商与处理商的绿色创新
合作有助于促进资源循环利用，减少二次污染，实现电子废弃物源头治理。现有关于电
子废弃物治理的研究集中于回收的模式选择与激励，基于回收价格的逆向供应链协调等
方面，鲜有关注制造商与处理商通过合作以激励制造商电子产品绿色创新的研究。基于
以上背景，本文运用博弈论与委托代理理论在以往学者研究的基础上，针对制造商电子
产品绿色创新，处理商与其在电子废弃物回收处理中合作的激励问题进行研究，主要从
以下几方面展开：
（1）绿色创新下制造商与处理商合作激励契约设计。首先，处理商设计收益共享
契约激励制造商提升产品绿色度，但是在最优的收益分享比例下，逆向供应链未达到系
统最优。因而，在此基础上引入虚拟第三方，通过设计双向激励契约，同时激励双方提
高电子产品绿色度和对电子废弃物拆解处理水平，消除企业个体与逆向供应链系统利益
的冲突，实现系统整体收益最大化

（2）绿色创新下考虑双边道德风险的制造商与处理商合作契约设计。由于信息的
非对称，双方合作中存在双边道德风险。为此，首先设计了单周期的正式契约，确定最
优的支付合同，以提升双方各自的努力程度。由于双方的努力投入未达到系统最优水平，
因而在正式契约的基础上，增加处理商“自我实施”约束条件弥补正式契约的不足，构
建关系契约，激励制造商与处理商同时提高努力水平达到系统最优，促进双方达成长期
合作

（3）绿色创新下考虑政府补贴的制造商与处理商激励契约设计。现阶段我国电子
废弃物回收处理体系尚未成熟，制造商与处理商的合作需要政府的扶持和引导，因此研
究了制造商与处理商在不同博弈关系下政府激励契约的设计，分析了政府与企业的最优
策略，为政府制定对企业的补贴政策提供理论参考

关键词：绿色创新，电子废弃物，关系契约，激励机制III
ABSTRACT
Electronic waste as a “city mine mountain” not only has a variety of recyclable materials, but also
contains harmful substances which affect environmental and human health. Therefore, green innovation
cooperation of electronic products manufacturers and waste processor promotes the recycling of resources,
reduce secondary pollution and achieve e-waste management at source. The existing research on e-waste
management focuses on the selection and incentive of recycling models, the coordination of reverse supply
chains based on the recovery price, and few researches on the green innovation incentive of electronic
products through the cooperation between manufacturers and processors. Based on the above background,
this paper uses game theory and principal-agent theory to study the cooperation incentive problem about
electronic products manufacturers green innovation with the e-waste processor in the process of electronic
waste recycling. On the basis of previous academic studies, this paper mainly launches from the following
aspects:
（1）Under green innovation manufacturers and processors cooperate incentive contract design. First,
the e-waste processor designs revenue share contract encourages manufacturers to increase the green level
of the product, but the best revenue share ratio does not achieve the optimal state of the reverse supply
chain system. Thus，the introduction of virtual third party on this basis, through the two-way incentive
contract of the penalty - transfer payment encourages both sides to improve the green degree of electronic
products and the level of e-waste dismantling and processing ,which eliminates the individual and reverse
supply chain system interests conflict to achieve the maximize system benefits .
（2）Under green innovative consider bilateral moral hazard manufacturers and processors
cooperation contract design. Because of information asymmetry, the bilateral moral hazard occurs in the
cooperation. First we design the single-cycle formal contract and determine the optimal payment contract to
enhance their level of effort on both sides. Since the efforts of both parties did not reach the optimal level
of the system .On the basis of the formal contract establishes relational contract adds through adding the
“self-implementation” constraints of the processor to achieve system optimal effort level and promote
long-term cooperation between the two sides.IV
（3）Under the Green innovation consider government subsidies manufacturers and processors
incentive contract design. In the face of the current situation of electronic waste recycling in China, the
cooperation between the manufacturer and the processor needs the support and guidance of the government.
Therefore, study the design of the government incentive contract under different game relationship between
the manufacturer and the processor, analyze the government and the enterprise the optimal strategy. For the
government provide a theoretical reference about subsidy policy formulation for electronic products
manufacturers and e-waste processors cooperation.
KEY WORDS: green innovation, e-waste, relational contract, incentiveV
目 录
摘要.......I
ABSTRACT ..... III
目 录.....V
第一章 绪论......1
1.1 研究背景及意义 . 1
1.1.1 研究背景....... 1
1.1.2 研究意义....... 2
1.2 国内外研究现状 . 3
1.2.1 电子废弃物治理形式及回收模式研究....... 3
1.2.2 逆向供应链协调问题研究... 4
1.2.3 电子废弃物回收处理激励问题研究........... 5
1.2.4 文献评述....... 6
1.3 研究内容、研究方法及创新之处 ......... 7
1.3.1 研究内容....... 7
1.3.2 研究方法....... 8
1.3.3 创新之处....... 8
第二章 相关概念及理论概述..9
2.1 逆向供应链概述 . 9
2.2 绿色创新概述 ... 10
2.3 博弈论概述 ....... 11
2.4 委托代理理论概述 ....... 12
第三章 绿色创新下制造商与处理商合作激励契约设计....15
3.1 背景及假设