CHINA'S LISTED COMPANIES AND ACCOUNTING
FIRMS GAME THEORY ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FRAUD
ABSTRACT
Game Model of China's listed companies and accounting firms and financial
statements fraud is to start from the definition of financial statements fraud,defined the
concept of financial statements, the three-factor theory lead to financial statement fraud,
the use of three-factor theory insights into the implementation of the financial
statements fraud motive, opportunity and excuse. Introduces the basic theory of game
theory, composed of the seven elements of the game, the basic methods of game theory,
followed by analysis of listed companies and accounting firms among the seven
elements of the game,the use of decision tree game model,build game revenue function,
and the game model of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, come to affect the listed
companies and accounting firms maximize the return game selection decision variables
to calculate the threshold for each decision variable threshold by determining the
decision variables size determines the choice of the game decisions. By the assumption
that the probability of fraud of listed companies, the draw is the excellent performance
of listed companies or poor performance of listed companies, revenue maximization
decisions are not implemented financial statement fraud. The mathematical derivation
derive the decision variables: impact on listed companies to select financial statement
fraud of listed companies by the magnitude of the punishment of government regulatory
agencies,accounting firms audit fees paid by listed companies, listed companies bribery
of Certified Public Accountants degree of size, namely, the collusion probability of firm
selection and poor performance-listed companies, listed companies and accounting
firms collusion income derived the threshold of decision variables, the use of the
threshold of the decision variables and influence decision-making factors size guide
both players make the optimal decision of the revenue maximization. Solving strategies:
(1) a balanced industrial development, promote economic growth, optimize the structure
of listed companies; (2) the construction of social integrity, to improve the performance
of listed companies and by analyzing the relationship of the impact of each decision
variable, in order to curb the listed companies in the implementation of financial
摘要
我国上市公司和会计师事务所财务报表舞弊的博弈模型分析是从财务报表舞
弊的定义入手,界定财务报表的概念,介绍了引发财务报表舞弊的三因素理论,
运用三因素理论分析上市公司实施财务报表舞弊的动机、机会和借口。介绍了博
弈论的基本理论,组成博弈的七要素,运用博弈论的基本方法,依次分析上市公
司和会计师事务所之间进行博弈的七要素,运用决策树的方式建立博弈模型,构
建博弈双方的收益函数,并对博弈模型的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡求解,得出影响上
市公司和会计师事务所收益最大化的博弈选择决策变量,计算出各个决策变量的
临界值,通过判断决策变量临界值的大小来决定博弈决策的选择。通过对上市公
司舞弊概率的假设,得出无论是业绩优良型上市公司还是业绩不良型上市公司,
收益最大化的决策都是不实施财务报表舞弊。运用数学推导,推导出了影响上市
公司选择财务报表舞弊的决策变量:上市公司被政府监管机构处罚的幅度、会计
师事务所获得上市公司支付的审计收费、上市公司贿赂会计师事务所程度的大
小、计师事务所选择与不良业绩型的上市公司串通舞弊的概率、上市公司与会计
师事务所进行串通舞弊得到的收益,推导出各个决策变量的临界值,运用各个决
策变量的临界值和其他影响决策因素的之间大小来指导博弈双方作出获得收益最
大化最优决策。通过分析各个决策变量的影响关系,为遏制上市公司实施财务报
表舞弊提出了解决策略:(1)均衡产业发展,促进经济增长,优化上市公司组成结
构;(2)建设诚信社会,提高上市公司和会计师事务所的诚信意识;(3)完善法律法
规,增强会计法律法规规范约束力
关键词:财务报表舞弊;博弈论,上市公司;会计师事务所;
三因素理论
statement fraud the accounting firm sense of integrity; (3) improve laws and regulations,
to enhance accounting laws and regulations regulate the binding.
KEYWORDS: financial statement fraud, game theory, listed companies,
accounting firms, tiiree-factor theory