摘要
摘要
二十一世纪是大数据的时代，可以说“得信息者得天下”。在资本市场
中，投资者会通过公司披露的信息作出自己的投资选择，但是由于身份的不
同，投资者和上市公司处于信息不对称的地位。近年来，我国股市中出现的
上市公司控股股东“掏空”上市公司的行为屡见不鲜。我国证券市场几乎每
年都会出现控股股东严重挪用、侵占上市公司资金的恶性事件，对中小股东
的利益造成了严重的侵害。为了规范上市公司的行为，提升上市公司信息披
露质量很有必要。因此本文从信息披露质量出发，研究其与大股东掏空之间
的关系，并且从信号传递的角度，分析了机构投资者作为调节变量强化了信
息披露质量对大股东掏空的抑制作用。
本文选取 2004-2018年深市 A股上市公司作为研究样本，实证检验了信
息披露质量和大股东掏空的关系，在此基础上引入机构投资者持股作为调节
变量进行进一步的研究。实证结果证明，信息披露质量与大股东掏空呈负相
关关系。另外，发现机构投资者不光能通过外部监督的途径对大股东掏空进
行抑制。也能够通过强化信息披露的传递来抑制大股东掏空，机构投资者在
其中起到了调节作用。
本文的实证结果说明在我国投资者保护制度不够完善的背景下，上市公
司信息披露质量的提高能够改善信息不对称，使得中小股东对上市公司的经
营情况和财务状况有更深入的了解，对上市公司控股股东利益侵占起到制约
作用；而机构投资者作为重要的市场参与者，在改善信息不对称方面有着不
可替代的作用。根据研究结果，本文建议进一步信息披露制度建设，提升上
市公司信息披露质量，有效改善控股股东和中小股东间的信息不对称问题。
此外，加强机构投资者队伍的建设，以此强化机构投资者的作用。
关键词：信息披露质量；机构投资者持股；大股东掏空
I

Abstract
Abstract
The 21st century is an era of big data. It can be said that "those who get
information get the world". In the capital market, investors will make their own
investment choices through the information disclosed by the company, but due to
different identities, investors and listed companies are in the position of asymmetric
information. In recent years, it is common for the controlling shareholders of listed
companies to "empty" the listed companies in China's stock market. Almost every
year in China's securities market, the controlling shareholders misappropriate and
encroach on the funds of listed companies, which seriously infringes on the interests
of small and medium shareholders. In order to regulate the behavior of listed
companies, it is necessary to improve the quality of information disclosure.
Therefore, starting from the quality of information disclosure, this paper studies the
relationship between the quality of information disclosure and the tunneling of
major shareholders, and from the perspective of signal transmission, analyzes that
institutional investors strengthen the inhibitory effect of the quality of information
disclosure on the tunneling of major shareholders.
This paper selects A-share listed companies in Shenzhen stock market from
2004 to 2018 as the research sample, empirically tests the relationship between the
quality of information disclosure and the tunneling of major shareholders, and on
this basis, introduces institutional investors' shareholding as a moderating variable
for further research. The empirical results show that there is a negative correlation
between the quality of information disclosure and tunneling. In addition, it is found
that institutional investors can not only restrain the tunneling of large shareholders
through external supervision. Institutional investors play a moderating role in this
process.
The empirical results show that under the background of imperfect investor
protection system in China, the improvement of information disclosure quality of
II

Abstract
listed companies can improve the information asymmetry, make the small and
medium shareholders have a deeper understanding of the operation and financial
situation of listed companies, and restrict the interest encroachment of controlling
shareholders of listed companies; As an important market participant, institutional
investors play an irreplaceable role in improving information asymmetry. According
to the research results, this paper proposes to further the construction of information
disclosure system, improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,
effectively improve the information asymmetry between controlling shareholders
and minority shareholders. In addition, strengthen the construction of the team of
institutional investors, so as to strengthen the role of institutional investors.
Key words: Information disclosure quality; Institutional investors holding shares;
Large shareholders tunneling
III
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