- I - 摘要 传统营销中，零售商只作为制造商的分销渠道，销售制造商品牌产品，且 在同一市场内与其他销售同品牌产品的零售商进行竞争。而制造商也可自主开 通网络直销渠道直接与消费者进行交易。所以，在与制造商的竞争中，零售商 相对比较弱势，急需采取措施改变现状。自有品牌的引入不仅可以帮助零售商 覆盖到更多的消费群体，还能增强零售商在渠道合作中的地位。在过去几十年 时间里，自有品牌已经发展成为零售商战略转型的有力武器。另外，在激烈的 市场竞争中，渠道各方为了争夺更大的市场份额势必会投入销售努力，进而对 市场需求产生影响。本文研究销售努力影响需求的单渠道二级供应链系统中自 有品牌引入问题，通过构建博弈模型，对模型进行理论和数值分析，得出本文 的主要研究结论。 在四种销售努力成本结构下，制造商利润与零售商引入的自有品牌产品和 现有的制造商品牌产品之间交叉价格弹性系数呈负相关关系。在无销售努力、 零售商提供销售努力以及双方都进行销售努力投入这三种成本结构下，零售商 利润与两种产品之间交叉价格弹性系数均呈正相关关系，零售商更有动机引入 与现有制造商品牌产品替代性高的自有品牌产品来实现更大的利润产出。在由 制造商来进行销售努力投入的成本结构中，当制造商的销售努力投入对产品销 量的促进作用很显著，且引入的自有品牌产品和制造商品牌产品替代性较弱时， 引入自有品牌可使渠道双方受益。而且在这种成本结构下，零售商利润随着两 种产品之间交叉价格弹性系数的增加而减少，零售商不会选择引入与制造商产 品替代性很高的自有品牌。在由零售商进行销售努力投入的成本结构中，零售 引入自有品牌之后，随着两种产品替代性的增加，零售商的销售努力增加，零 售商利润增加。对于此时的制造商来说，自有品牌的引入并不一定是损害到其 利润，此时的销售努力增加也会增加制造商品牌产品的销量。最后，分析了不 同成本结构下渠道各方利润和渠道总利润，发现在存在零售商自有品牌产品的 市场环境中，并不是制造商和零售商双方都各自以利润最大化为目标进行销售 努力投入就能实现渠道整体利润的最大化。当两种产品之间替代性较小时，制 造商选择进行销售努力投入能够实现渠道整体利润最大化。当两种产品之间替 代性足够大时，零售商进行销售努力投入能够实现渠道整体利润最大化。 关键词，销售努力；零售商自有品牌；制造商品牌；供应链Abstract - II - ABSTRACT In the traditional marketing channel, the retailer only serves as the manufacturer's distribution channel. They sell the manufacturer's national brand products, and competes with other retailers who holds the same products in the same market. Manufacturers can also open online sales channel to directly trade with consumers. Therefore, retailers are relatively weak in the competition with manufacturers. They urgently need to take steps to change the status quo. The introduction of store brands not only helps retailers reach more consumer groups, but also enhances retailers' status in channel cooperation. In the past few decades, store brands have evolved into powerful weapons for retailers to make strategic transformations. In the fierce market competition, in order to compete for a larger market share, all parties in the channel will inevitably put into sales efforts, which will have an impact on market demand. This paper studies the introduction of retailers' store brands in the single-channel secondary supply chain system whose demand is affected by the level of sales effort. By constructing the game model, this paper analyze the introduction of store brand theoretically and numerically, and then the main conclusions of this paper are obtained. Under the four sales effort cost structures, there is a negative correlation between the manufacturer's profit and the cross-price elasticity coefficient between the retailer's store brand and the existing national brand. Under the three cost structures of no sales efforts, retailers providing sales efforts, and both parties providing sales efforts, the retailer's profit is positively correlated with the cross-price elasticity coefficient between the two products. And the retailer is more motivated to introduce the store brand which can be high replacement of national brand. In the cost structure where the manufacturer invest sales efforts, the introduced store brand and the national brand are less alternative when the manufacturer's sales efforts are significantly contributing to the sales of the products. At this time, the introduction of store brands can benefit both parties in the supply chain. Moreover, under this cost structure, retailer profits decrease as the cross-price elasticity coefficient between the two products increases, and retailers will not introduce store brands with high substitution. In the cost structure where retailers are engaged in sales efforts, the retailer's sales efforts and profits increase as the substitution of the two products increases. For the manufacturer at this time, the introduction of store brands does not necessarily damage his profit. The increase in sales efforts will also increase the sales of the national brand. Finally, this paper analyzes manufacturer profit, retailer profit and total profit under different costAbstract - III - structures. It is found that in the market where the retailer's store brand have been introduced, it is not always possible to maximize the overall profit of the channel when both manufacturers and retailers make sales efforts. When the substitution between the two products is small, the cost structure of the manufacturer's sales efforts can maximize the overall profit of the channel. When the substitution between the two products is large enough, the retailer's sales efforts can maximize the overall profit of the channel. Keywords: retailer’s store brand, national brand, sales efforts, supply chain目 录 - IV - 目 录 摘要 ..........................................................................................................................I ABSTRACT................................................................................................................ II 第 1 章 绪 论 ...........................................................................................................1 1.1 研究背景和问题提出 ................................................................................ 1 1.2 国内外研究现状评述 ................................................................................ 2 1.2.1 国外研究现状............................................................................................ 3 1.2.2 国内研究现状............................................................................................ 5 1.2.3 研究现状综述............................................................................................ 7 1.3 研究目的和意义........................................................................................ 7 1.3.1 研究目的.................................................................................................... 7 1.3.2 研究意义.................................................................................................... 8 1.4 研究内容与研究方法 ................................................................................ 8 1.4.1 研究内容.................................................................................................... 8 1.4.2 研究方法.................................................................................................... 9 1.4.3 研究创新点.............................................................................................. 10 1.4.4 技术路线.................................................................................................. 10 第 2 章 理论基础与模型构建 .................................................................................12 2.1 理论基础 ................................................................................................. 12 2.1.1 斯坦克尔伯格模型.................................................................................. 13 2.1.2 利润最大化理论...................................................................................... 12 2.2 模型构建 ................................................................................................. 14 2.2.1 问题描述.......................................................................................