Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RANDintellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publicationonline is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as itis unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any ofits research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit /pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help makecommunities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit,nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at /giving/contributeLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9973-0 For more information on this publication, visit /t/RR2278 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R is a registered trademark.iiiPrefaceThe 1993 Bottom-Up Review starts with this challenge: “Now that the Cold War is over, thequestions we face in the Department of Defense are: How do we structure the armed forces ofthe United States for the future How much defense is enough in the post–Cold War era”1Finding a satisfactory answer to these deceptively simple questions not only motivated theBottom-Up Review but has arguably animated defense strategy for the past quarter century.Indeed, over that period, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has labored under successiveadministrations to not only a write a strategy but build a process that prioritizes threats; alignsresources accordingly; and seamlessly links ends, ways, and means together into a compellingnarrative. And yet, few say they believe that any of the dozen major defense reviews over thepast quarter century produced a satisfactory answer to this task.This study, conducted in RAND Project AIR FORCE’s Strategy and Doctrine Program, asks:Why has the defense strategy process evolved in the way it has Why, despite so much time andeffort, do strategies so often come up short And, most importantly, how can the process changeto make for better strategy This report traces the post–Cold War history of defense reviewsfrom Base Force through the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. It then borrows politicalscientist Robert Putnam’s framework of a two-level game to understand the political constraintson defense reviews and argues that these constraints limit the decision space in these reviews— producing a powerful, if ultimately disappointing, tendency to embrace the status quo. The reportconcludes with recommendations for the services and DoD at large about how to improve boththe process and content of future defense strategy.This research was sponsored by the Director of Strategy, Concepts and Assessments, DeputyChief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements (AF/A5S). It is part of a larger study, titledDefense Strategic Processes: How the Force Planning Construct and Scenarios Inform the POM,which assists the Air Force with preparing for the 2018 National Defense Strategy.This report should be of value to the national security community and interested members ofthe general public, especially those with an interest in the history and politics behind the makingof defense strategy.RAND Project AIR FORCERAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. AirForce’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAFprovides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the 1 Les Aspin,Report on the Bottom-Up Review , Washington, D.C., October 1993, p. 1. ivdevelopment, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, andcyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment;Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. Theresearch reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000.Additional information about PAF is available on our website: /pafThis report documents work originally shared with the U.S. Air Force on May 12, 2017. Thedraft report, issued on September 1, 2017, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and U.S. AirForce subject-matter experts.vContentsPreface .. iii Figures and Tables ......... vi Summary .......... vii Acknowledgments ......... ix Abbreviations ..... x 1. The Quixotic Quest for a “True” Defense Strategy .... 1 Definitions and Methodology .. 2 Overview and the Argument of the Report ...... 4 2. The History of Defense Reviews ....... 5 The Base Force (1989–1992) .. 5 The Bottom-Up Review (1993) ........... 8 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (1995)....... 12 The Quadrennial Defense Review (1997) ...... 14 National Defense Panel (1997) .......... 19 The Quadrennial Defense Review (2001) ...... 22 The Quadrennial Defense Review (2006) ...... 26 The Quadrennial Defense Review (2010) ...... 30 The Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (2010) . 34 The Defense Strategic Guidance (2012) ........ 36 The Quadrennial Defense Review (2014) ...... 39 National Defense Panel (2014) .......... 43 Understanding the “Unhappy Families”......... 45 3. The Politics of Defense Reviews ..... 48 How Much Do Defense Reviews Matter ...... 48 Why Are Defense Reviews’ Impact Seemingly So Limited .. 52 Should Defense Reviews Matter More ......... 60 Why Strategies Disappoint .... 63 4. Making the Most Out of the Game .. 64 How a Service Can Get the Most of the Process ........ 64 How the Defense Department Can Get the Most of the Process ......... 67 How the United States Can Get the Most out of the Reviews . 71 Appendix. Defense Reviews and Predicting the Future . 73 References ........ 84 。。。。。。