Contents
The Secrecy Paradigm2
Evaluating the Secrecy Paradigm .......5
Paradigm Shift: Path to Secrecy Modernization ......24
Appendix: Study Methodology .........28
Notes .30
About the Authors .....35
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T
his Perspective summarizes our key fndings
and conclusions regarding the adequacy of the
present system governing secrecy in U.S. national
security information. Tis work, based on a novel
approach and expert opinion—including our
own direct experience with the issues—aims to provide
recommendations to improve the system that makes,
safeguards, and discloses secrets. An improved system will
aford signifcantly better protection to secrets that truly
need it, reduce overclassifcation by providing clear param-
eters for creating secrets, and more fully support govern-
ment transparency goals.
Te impetus for this examination of secrecy issues
came from two related but seemingly contradictory consid-
erations. On one hand, there are signifcant high-level con-
cerns about damage to national security through the public
availability of massive amounts of classifed information on
the internet, as exemplifed by the unprecedented scale of
unauthorized disclosures by Edward Snowden and Private
Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning on WikiLeaks and in news
media accounts.1 On the other hand, advocates of greater
transparency in government continue to voice concerns
that national interests are harmed because the government
keeps too much information classifed about its operations
and their impact on the public.2 Both these critiques sug-
gest that the current secrecy system is failing to fulfll its
principal purposes: frst, protecting classifed information
critical to national security and, second, reducing overclas-
sifcation and ofcially disclosing classifed information to
further government transparency and accountability.
To test our premise that the secrecy system is gener-
ally failing to meet these key goals and thus needs repair,
we conducted an extensive literature review; interviewed
current and former senior U.S. government ofcials and
other subject-matter experts (SMEs) and stakeholders;
and benefted from insightful commentary from a one-
day workshop, “Assessing the Secrecy Paradigm for the
Future Information Environment,” which was convened in
partnership with the American Bar Association’s Standing
Committee on Law and National Security. Informed by
these data, we analyzed key factors that drive how well
or how poorly the system for national security secrecy
works—and why. (For elaboration, see the appendix.)