摘要

近年来气候变化的问题在全球受到广泛关注。由于全球环境质量是国际性的公共品，
全球变暖是所有国家二氧化碳碳排放积聚的结果，缺乏清晰的产权，所以各国政府通过气
候政策干预解决这一问题。

本文从碳税、碳关税、碳减排合作的现实和理论背景出发，通过对相应文献的梳理，
阐述了碳税、碳关税、碳减排合作三种政策的基本概念、理论内涵及相关效应。文章基于
微分博弈原理，构建了全球福利最大化下的两国微分博弈模型，分析了碳税、碳关税、碳
减排合作三种气候政策对全球福利和全球碳排放的影响。运用 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman 方
程分别求得了静态线性 Markov 完美纳什均衡的最优碳税和碳关税水平。

结果发现，研究发现，在给定的碳排放水平下，全球福利在单边碳税政策下最小，碳
关税次之，碳减排合作政策下最大；但碳排放存量则以单边碳税政策的最大，碳关税政策
的次之，碳减排合作政策的最小；就全球碳减排效应而言，碳减排合作政策是最优的，碳
关税政策次之，单边碳税政策最差。这主要是由于单边碳税存在“碳泄漏”现象和“免费
搭车效应”，使执行相对宽松环境标准的国家从中受益，同时严格的环境政策将有利于环
境宽松政策国家的企业国际竞争力的提高，即存在“租金转移效应”。碳关税和碳减排合
作政策则可以部分或完全消除这些效应的影响。

关键词：气候政策；微分博弈；环境效应；碳税；碳关税；碳合作减排
The problem of climate change attracts extensive attention worldwide. It is commonly
acknowledged that the quality of global environment is an international public good, the
accumulation of carbon dioxide result from the pollution all around the world. For the lack of
property, all the governments use the instructions named climate policy to deal with the problem.
Based on the realistic background, the paper did a literature review of the mechanism and
effects of three different climate policies, named carbon tax policy, carbon tariff policy and
carbon emission cooperation policy respectively. Then based on the theory of intra-industry trade
and differential game, where are studies the stock of carbon emissions with the two countries
differential game models in the condition of global warfare maximization, analysis the effect of
carbon tax, carbon tariff and carbon emission cooperation policy towards global warfare, and get
the optimal carbon tax rate and carbon tariff rate in a stationary Markov perfect Nash equilibrium
by Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
The results show that given the same level of carbon emission, global welfare weights least
with one side policy of carbon tax, more with carbon tariff and most with carbon emission
cooperation. But when it comes to stock of carbon emissions, the largest amount lies with one
side policy of carbon tax, the next largest with carbon tariff and the least with carbon emission
cooperation. Besides, in terms of effects of global carbon emission, the most useful one is carbon
emission cooperation, less useful would be carbon tariff and the least useful policy is one side
policy of carbon tax. This is because in the presence of carbon tax, there exists “carbon leakage”
and “free-riding effect”, in which the foreign country enjoys a future improvement in global
environmental quality without incurring costs for pollution control, which is implemented in the
home country. At the same time, a tougher environmental policy in the home country enhances
the competitiveness of the foreign firm because of an increase in the home firm’s pollution
abatement costs, this is called “rent-shifting effect”. Then the carbon tariff and carbon emission
corporation policy can be partially or completely eliminate these effects.
Keywords: climate policy; differential game; environmental effect; carbon tax; carbon tariff;
carbon emission cooperation